Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a Legal Duty to Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain by Reynolds, Michael J.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 15 
Issue 1 Volume 15, Fall 2000, Issue 1 Article 4 
September 2000 
Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a Legal Duty 
to Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain 
Michael J. Reynolds 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Reynolds, Michael J. (2000) "Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a Legal Duty to Prescribe 
Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , 
Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol15/iss1/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
MORPHINE OR MALPRACTICE: SHOULD
COURTS RECOGNIZE A LEGAL DUTY TO
PRESCRIBE OPIATES FOR TREATING CHRONIC
PAIN
INTRODUCTION
Pain is the leading reason patients seek medical attention and the
primary symptom in over 80% of all physician visits.1 Although
pain is universally experienced and increasingly understood,2 the
undertreatment of chronic pain continues to be a major public
health concern 3 affecting over 50 million people and costing over
$70 billion per year in health care spending and lost productivity. 4
In fact, a 1994 survey found that nearly 25 million people sought
help from alternative therapy professionals for pain relief because
1 See H. Koch, The Management of Chronic Pain in Office-based Ambulatory Care: National
Center for Health Statistics, National Ambulatory Care Survey, Department of Health and
Human Services DHHS Public Health Service No. 86-1250, Hyattsville, Md. (1986).
2 See HOWARD L. FIELDS ET AL., EDS., 9 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 617,
617-28 (1985); see also J. David Haddox & Gerald M. Aronoff, Commentary: The Potential For
Unintended Consequences From Public Policy Shifts in the Treatment of Pain, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
350, 351 (1998) (stating that means, knowledge and medications exist to manage allpain more
effectively than it is presently being managed); Sandra H. Johnson, End-Of-Life Decision
Making: What We Don't Know, We Make Up; ihat We Do Know, We Ignore, 31 IND. L. REV. 13, 33
(1998) (noting that medical capacity to relieve pain is greater than it has ever been).
3 See, e.g., Alfred F. Connors et al., A Controlled Trial to hnprove Care for Seriously IIl Hospital
Patients, The Study to Understand Progress and Preferences for Outcomes and Risk, 274 JAMA 1591,
1594-97 (1995) (describing result of Robert Wood Johnson study of 9,105 dying patients in five
teaching hospitals which found that pain management in these patients was inappropriate or
insufficient); see also Bruce A. Ferrell et al., Pain in the Nursing Home 37 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y
409 (1990) (finding that 2/3 of nursing home patients experience untreated moderate to severe
pain); Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmaglignant Pain: A Review of the
Critical Issues, 11 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 204 (1996) (showing deficiencies in treating
chronic pain). See generally J. David Haddox et al., The Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic
Pain: A Consensus Statement From the American Academy of Pain Medicine and the American Pain
Society, 13 CLIN. J. PAIN 6, 6 (1997) (stating that pain is often managed inadequately).
4 See John J. Bonica, Status of Pain Research and Therapy, 5 SEMINARS IN ANESTHESIA 82, 83
(1986) (estimating that chronic pain effected over 90 million people, causing approximately
750 million lost workdays in 1983); see also Fenella Rouse, Decision Making About Medical
Innovation: Role of the Advocate, 57 ALB. L. REV. 607, 608 (1994) (discussing Bonica's findings
and other statistics analyzing costs of under-treatment of chronic pain).
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traditional therapies were insufficient.5
Opioid medications6 have proven to be the most effective
analgesics 7 available in treating moderate to severe pain,8 and the
use of opioids to treat acute pain9 and managing chronic cancer
painO has been clearly recognized. Both the medical" and
regulatory12 communities, however, continue to debate the proper
5 See L. Clarke Paramore, Use of Alternative Therapies: Estimates from the 1994 Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation National Access to Care Survey, 13 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 83, 85-89 (1997)
(analyzing survey data on patient visits to four different alternative therapy providers
including chiropractors, therapeutic masseuses, relaxation technique specialists, and
acupuncturists).
6 See Jerome H. Jaffe & Ai B. Jaffe, Neurobiology of Opiates/Opioids, in MARC GALANTER &
HERBERT KLEBER, TEXTBOOK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 11-12, 17-18 (2nd ed. 1998)
(referring to opioids as any natural drug derived from opium which is meant to be used in
treatment of moderate to severe pain).
7 See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 71 (12"h ed. 1974) (defining analgesia as
absence of normal sense of pain); see also id. (defining analgesic as medicine that relieves pain).
8 See E. Leong Way, A Pharmacologist's Concept of Narcotics, as reported in C. STRATrON
HILL & WILLIAM S. FIELDS, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 39, 46 (1989)
[hereinafter 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY] (explaining that term opioid
serves as better description than narcotic for this class of medications since these compounds,
especially synthetic compounds, readily relieve pain without producing narcosis or state of
stupor).
9 See Ada Jacox & Daniel Carr, Acute Pain Management: Operative or Medical Procedures and
Trauma, Clinical Practice Guideline no. 1, Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
("AHCPR") publication no. 92-0032 (1992) (recommending guidelines for use of opioids in
treating traumatic and post-surgical pain); see also Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic For
Treating Patients With Chronic Pain: What Can Medical Boards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332,
333 (1998) (referring to impressive body of literature, including clinical studies, that provide
compelling evidence for use of opioid analgesics to treat chronic pain); Ben A. Rich, A
Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care For Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1, 91 n.186 (2000) (noting that an aggressive approach to relief of severe and persistent
pain often involves sustained use of opioid analgesics).
10 See Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of the
Dying, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308, 310 (1998) (pointing out that major group of drugs used in
cancer pain management are opioid analgesics); Ada Jacox et al., New Clinical-Practice
Guidelines for the Management of Pain in Patients With Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 651, 651-55
(1994) (discussing use of opioids to manage pain in cancer patients); Stephen A. Schug et al., A
Long-Term Survey of Morphine in Cancer Pain Patients, 7 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 259, 259
(1992) (noting that during past 20 years morphine has become mainstay pharmacological
treatment for cancer pain); V. A. Walker et al., Evaluation of WHO Guidelines for Cancer Pain in a
Hospital-Based Palliative Care Unit, 3 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 145 (1988); see also Kathleen M.
Foley, The Treatment of Cancer Pain, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 84, 84-95 (1985).
11 See Michael Zenz et al., Long-Term Oral Opioid Therapy in Patients With Chronic
Nonmalignant Pain, 7 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 69, 76 (1992) (concluding there is no
justification for withholding opioids for chronic nonmalignant pain patients when all other
therapeutic measures have failed); see also Russell K. Portenoy, Chronic Opioid Therapy in
Nonmalignant Pain, 5 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. S46, S46-S62 (1990) (advocating use of opioids
for this patient group). But see Christoph Stein, Opioid Treatment of Chronic Nonmalignant Pain,
84 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 912, 913 (1997) (concluding that efficacy of opioids in chronic
non-malignant pain remains scientifically unproven); Dennis C. Turk, Clinicians' Attitudes
About Prolonged Use of Opioids and the Issue of Patient Heterogeneity, 11 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 218, 220-23 (1996) (questioning validity of current studies on opioid efficacy in non-
malignant pain patients).
12 See C. Stratton Hill, Jr., Government Regulatony Influences on Opioid Prescribing and Their
OPIATES FOR CHRONIC PAIN
use of opioids to treat long-term, non-malignant intractable pain.
As the debate continues over the proper indications of opioid
medications, the result is that millions of Americans are forced to
endure intractable, unremitting pain and needless suffering as part
of their daily existence.13 This Note advocates that chronic pain
patients should utilize tort law to vindicate their rights. Such a
theory would permit state courts to recognize a tort claim in medical
malpractice against physicians who underprescribe opioid
medications for those suffering chronic pain.
Part I of this Note reviews the controversial issues current in the
debate and explains some of the barriers that exist in reaching a
rational outcome. Part II examines the proposed medical
malpractice cause of action, including the argument for its
recognition, as well as defense counter-arguments. Part III
evaluates acceptance of this theory, concluding that it is necessary
for the courts to fashion a remedy for these plaintiffs.
I. REASONS FOR THE PROBLEM
A. Federal Government's Regulaton Influences
The Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"),14 administered by the
Drug Enforcement Administration,S is the principal federal law that
regulates the prescribing of controlled substances. Opioids are
Impact on the Treatment of Pain of Nonmalignant Origin, 11 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 287, 289-
92 (1996) (discussing impact of healthcare practice acts on prescribing opioids for
nonmalignant pain); Chris S. Hyman, Pain Management and Disciplinary Action: How Medical
Boards Can Remove the Barriers to Effective Treatment, 24 J.L. MEDICINE & ETHICS 338, 339-42
(1996) (discussing role of regulatory process in improving pain management); C. Norman
Shealy, Opioids and Controlled Substances in Chronic Benign Pain: A Survey of State Medical
Boards, 1 AM. J. PAIN MGMT. 10, 10-14 (1997). But see Leslie F. Bernia et al., Note: Physician
Perception of a Triplicate Prescription Law, 42 AM. J. HOSP. PHARMACY 857, 859 (1985)
(concluding physicians generally supported triplicate prescription law aimed at curbing
narcotic prescriptions); Gene R. Haislip, Impact of Drug Abuse on Legitimate Drug Use, 11
ADVANCES IN PAIN AND THERAPY 205, 209 (1989) (concluding law is not problem in
underprescribing of opioids in cancer patients).
13 See Koch, supra note 1; Bonica, supra note 4, at 83.
14 See Controlled Substances Act, Public Law 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, codified as 21 U.S.C. §
801 et seq. (1970); see also Douglas J. Pisano, Controlled Substances and Pain Management:
Regulatory Oversight, Formnnularies, and Cost Decisions, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 310, 310 (1996)
(noting that all practice oriented drug law and regulation is based on CSA).
15 See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) and § 1306.07(c) (1996) (authorizing DEA to monitor and
regulate use of controlled substances for medical use); see also Pisano, supra note 14, at 310
(stating that CSA falls under regulatory authority of DEA).
2000]
82 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 15:79
included in Schedule II of the CSA because of their potential for
abuse.16
The CSA, however, implicitly recognizes the medical value of
opioids in treating chronic pain. For example, the definition of
"addict" under the CSA does not include chronic pain patients.17
Further, the CSA and the corresponding federal regulations do not
limit the amount of drug that a physician can prescribe at one
time.18 Thus, when read together, the CSA and the corresponding
regulations clearly recognize the legitimate use of opioids to treat
chronic, intractable pain.19
B. State Government Regulatory Schemes
State substance abuse laws (similar to federal law) recognize that
controlled substances have accepted medical uses and allow
physicians to prescribe these drugs in the course of their
professional practice.20 Contrary to federal law, however, state laws
generally do not contain provisions recognizing the efficacy of
opioid use in treating chronic pain.21 Moreover, state laws often fail
16 See 21 C.F.R. § 1306; see also Pisano, supra note 14, at 311-12 (discussing CSA
"scheduling" scheme for prescription medications based on drug's abuse potential).
17 See CSA § 102(16) (defining addict as "any individual who habitually uses any narcotic
drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted
to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his
addiction"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2901 (1999) (defining same); Hyman, supra note 12, at 339-42
(defining term "addict").
18 See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.
19 See Robert T. Angarola & Susan D. Wray, Legal hipediments to Cancer Pain Treatment, 11
ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 213, 216 (1989) (stating DEA has not intentionally
impeded access to medically needed controlled substances); Haislip, supra note 12, at 206
(acknowledging that federal drug policy recognizes importance of prescribing and dispensing
controlled substances for legitimate medical purposes); David E. Joranson, Federal and State
Regulation of Opiods, 5 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. SIZ S12-23 (1990) (analyzing federal policy
and reaching same conclusion); Rich, supra note 9, at 91 n.186 (pointing out that DEA
disclaims any intent to discourage appropriate use of controlled substances by physicians to
deal with patients' genuine medical needs).
20 See Hill, supra note 12, at 287-88 (recognizing that although opioids are used to treat
pain, physicians are reluctant to prescribe these drugs because of fears over regulatory
scrutiny); David E. Joranson & June L. Dahl, Achieving Balance in Drng Policy: The Wisconsin
Model, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 197, 200 (1989) (discussing state
policies). But see Martino, supra note 9, at 335 (detailing causes for underprescribing opioids);
F. J. Skelly, Fear of Sanctions Limits Prescribing of Pain Drngs, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Aug.
15, 1994, at 19.
21 See Joranson, supra note 19, at S12-23 (stating that state laws generally do not contain
affirmative language recognizing essential value of controlled substances, or provisions
recognizing opioid treatment of intractable pain); see also Haddox & Aronoff, supra note 2, at
350-52 (discussing shift in public policy regarding legitimacy of treating chronic pain with
opioids and rise of state laws known as Intractable Pain Treatment Acts, commonly referred
to as "IPTAs", or adopted administrative rules or guidelines meant to alleviate risks of
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to define essential terms like "addict" or "dependence." When they
do, the definition is so broad that it encompasses not only the
traditional drug abuser, but also the chronic pain patient.22
Furthermore, some states, as part of their legislative scheme, require
physicians to report suspected "addicts" or "habitual users" of
controlled substances to state authorities. 23
Eleven states have gone farther by adopting either a multiple
copy or electronic prescription program as an additional measure to
curb illicit drug diversion.24 Evaluations of these programs
demonstrate that they have an immediate impact on the prescribing
practices of physicians, substantially reducing the prescribing of
Schedule II medications. 25 For example, the empirical data in a
Texas study showed that after the program started in 1982,
prescriptions dropped for the more potent Schedule II opioids but
increased for less potent pain medications which were not subject to
regulatory scrutiny.26 Commentators have suggested that these
sanction by state medical boards when physicians prescribe opioids for chronic pain and
legitimize use of controlled drugs in pain management when there is therapeutic reason for
prescribing); see e.g., The Intractable Pain Treatment Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 4495c
(West 1996); Tex. Admin. Code tit. 22, §§ 170.1-.3 (1996); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2241.5 (West
1999); Pain Patient's Bill of Rights, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 124961 (West 1999).
22 See, e.g., New York Public Health Law § 3302 (1) (McKinney 1999) (defining "addict" as
a person who habitually uses a narcotic drug and who by reason of such use is dependent
thereon"); see also Joranson, supra note 19, at S12-23 (noting longstanding problem in attempts
to clarify term "addict" and discussing Texas physicians' concerns about how provision in
Texas Medical Practice Act concerning writing prescriptions for "habitual users", where this
term is undefined, affects prescribing opioids for patients with intractable pain); Portenoy,
supra note 11, at S46-S62 (discussing confusion in nomenclature of drug dependence).
23 See, e.g., New York Public Health Law § 3372 (requiringphysicians to report "addicts"
to Commissioner of Health); Rhode Island Uniform Controlled Substances Act, G.L. 1956
(1989 Re-enactment) § 21-28-3.20 (requiring physicians to report extended treatment of
patients, defined as treatment greater than three months, to Director of Health).
24 See David E. Joranson & Aaron M. Gilson, inproving Pain Management Through Policy
Making and Education for Medical Regulators, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 344, 345 (1996) (describing
multiple prescription system and discussing restrictions system places on physicians and
patients); Rich, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that DEA endorses MCPP as deterrent to illegal
diversion of controlled substances); Mike Troy, Dealing with Diversion; Abuse of Prescription
Drngs, 16 DRUG STORE NEWS 1 (1994) (listing states requiring some form of multiple
prescription for controlled substances and those also using electronic systems for monitoring
controlled substance prescriptions).
25 See Katherine A. Sigler et aL, Effect of a Triplicate Prescription Law on Prescribing of
Schedule II Drugs, 41 AM. J. HOsp. PHARMACY 108, 109-10 (1984) (showing a 60.4% decrease in
Schedule II prescriptions in 1,200 bed teaching hospital one year after enactment); see also
James M. Cooper et al., Prescription Drug Diversion Control and Medical Practice, 268 JAMA
1306, 1307 (1992) (noting same results, and questioning clinical implications for patients);
Joranson, supra note 19, at S12-23 (discussing results documented from evaluation of
programs); M. Weintraub et al., Consequences of the 1989 New York State Triplicate Benzodiazepine
Prescription Regulations, 266 JAMA 2392, 2392-97 (1991) (noting dramatic decrease in
benzodiazepine prescriptions one year after enactment).
26 See Sigler, supra note 25, at 110.
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shifts in prescription practices (done in an effort to avoid
government regulators) substantially contribute to the under-
treatment of pain.27
State medical boards and regulatory agencies exert subtle to
moderate influence on physician practices by monitoring the
prescription of certain medications and sanctioning practitioners
who over-prescribe with the loss or suspension of their license.28
Fear of legal or disciplinary action are a major reason physicians
have under-prescribed opioids for pain.29
A recent case from Florida illustrates this point. In Hoover v.
Agency for Health Care Administration,30 the Florida Court of Appeals
overturned its state board's decision which required a doctor to pay
a $4,000 fine, complete continuing medical education on the
prescribing of "abusable" drugs, and serve two years probation.31
The state board sanctioned the physician for helping seven different
patients who suffered from intractable pain.32 These penalties were
assessed by the state board despite a finding from one of the
agency's own hearing officers that the board had failed to prove any
of its charges against the doctor. 33
The board had relied on the testimony of two physicians whom
had supported the charges.34 These purported experts, however,
never examined the patients nor did they review their medical
27 See Hill, supra note 12, at 289-92. The author argues essentially that the physician, who
often has no knowledge of the rules followed by the regulatory agency will play it "safe" and
choose a less potent or unregulated drug to avoid attention. This practice then leads to
inherent undertreatment of pain. It is important to remember that undertreating pain is
distinct from no treatment of pain. When a patient requires a stronger opioid medication like
oxycodone or oral morphine for proper analgesia, but winds up receiving a weaker drug from
the physician because it does not appear on the list of Schedule II medications, the system is
self defeating. The patient's pain will not be relieved. Id. at 294-95. But see David L. Ralston,
Pain Management: Texas Legislative and Regulatory Update, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 328, 334-35,
n.8 (1996). Mr. Ralston tested the hypothesis of whether the propensity of physicians to treat
pain adequately would be lower among physicians who perceived themselves at risk for
regulatory sanctions. He found the data shows that other variables (such as lack of education
and training in the proper use of opioid analgesia) contributed to the inadequate treatment of
ain. He states: " The greater a physician's knowledge level as expressed by the five
owledge factors surveyed .. the more likely the physician was to treat pain adequately-"
This factor would be consistent independently of the physician's knowledge of the current
regulatory environment. Id.
28 See infra notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text.
29 See Hill, supra note 12, at 287-88; Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief.
An Analysis of the Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319 (1996).
30 676 So.2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
31 See Hoover, 676 So.2d at 1382 (describing agency action).
32 See id. at 1381.
33 See id. at 1382.
34 See id. at 1381.
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records. 35 Moreover, neither of these physicians had any experience
treating patients in chronic pain; and their testimony were
conclusions based on a review solely of pharmacy records detailing
the type and amounts of the prescribed medications. 36 The
defendant's experts testified that the defendant had followed
protocols within the guidelines for treating patients with intractable
pain.37 Furthermore, the facts demonstrated that two of the patients
achieved relief from their pain and showed functional improvement
while under the defendant's care.38
The appellate court reversed the board's decision noting that the
paucity of evidence offered did not justify the sanctions imposed,
emphasizing that neither doctor testifying for the state had any
experience in treating this type of patient.39 The court was also
surprised that the board would sanction a doctor with such little
evidence of misconduct.40
The plight of Dr. Hoover has created a chilling effect on
physician's use of opioids in treating chronic, non-malignant pain.41
In response, some states have enacted legislation aimed at
remedying this problem. 42 A review of recent cases, however, leads
to an interesting conclusion. Courts have reversed adverse medical
board decisions when the physician has followed accepted medical
practices with respect to using opioids in treating chronic pain.43
35 See id.
36 See id. at 1381-82.
37 See id. at 1382, 1384.
38 See id. at 1382 (dismissing complaint as to two patients).
39 See id. at 1384.
40 See Hoover, 676 So.2d at 1384-85.
41 See Hyman, supra note 12, at 339 (stating that overlapping federal and state regulatory
processes govern physician's conduct in prescribing controlled substances); Johnson, supra
note 29, at 320-24; see also C. Stratton Hill, Jr., The Negative Influence of Licensing and Disciplinary
Boards and Drug Enforcement Agencies in Pain with Opioid Analgesics, 1993 J. PHARMACEUTICAL
CARE AND PAIN SYMPTOM CONTROL, at 43-62; Shealy, supra note 12, at 10-14. See generally
Joseph J. Finn, Acts of Omission and Commission in Pain Management: The Ethics of Naloxone Use,
17 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 120, 120-22 (1999) (describing stigma that has attached to use
and administration of opioids, and drawing interesting dichotomy between goals of pain
specialists and countervailing goals of specialists dealing with substance abuse).
42 See, e.g., The Intractable Pain Treatment Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 4495c (West
1996); Tex. Admin. Code tit 22, §§ 170.1-.3 (1996); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2241.5 (West 1999);
Pain Patient's Bill of Rights, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 124961 (West 1999). See also
Federation of State Medical Boards, Model Guidelines for Use of Controlled Substances for the
Treatment of Pain, (May 1998) at <httpi/www.fsmb.org/pain.htin>, (outlining recommended
guidelines for state medical boards to follow).
43 See McNeil v. Tennessee Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, No. 01-A-01-9608, 1997 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 152, at *30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1997) (reversing medical board decision to suspend
physicians' licenses because board failed to show that treatment of patients with narcotics
violated standard of care); In re DiLeo, 661 So.2d 162, 167-68 (holding that state medical board
2000]
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Likewise, courts have upheld state board actions suspending or
revoking a physician's license for over-prescribing narcotics when
the physician has failed to follow accepted medical practices. 44
Thus, courts recognize that long-term use of opioids to treat
intractable pain is an accepted standard of medical care when
physicians follow medically accepted practices; and the chilling
effect of these state board actions on physician prescribing practices
may be an overstatement.45 The persistent under-prescription of
opioids among physicians, however, may reflect a more pervasive
problem that cannot simply be explained as a perceived fear of
failed to show that Dr. DiLeo violated state's Medical Practice Act in prescribing pain
medications); Johnson v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 456 So.2d 939, 942-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (reversing finding of medical board that Dr. Johnson violated state's Medical Practice
Act by prescribing opioids for long-term use by patients in chronic pain, and awarding Dr.
Johnson attorney's fees in dispute); see also Sharon B. Roberts, All "Pushers" Are Not Created
Equal! The Inequities of Sanctions for Physicians Who Inappropriately "Prescribe" Controlled
Substances, 23 NOVA L. REv. 881, 892-93 (citing examples of courts overturning Board's
recommendations for sanctions).
44 See Johnson v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, No. 98Ap-1324, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4487, at
*25 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999) (upholding medical board's revocation of license because
physician failed to keep proper medical records of prescriptions, and physician ignored
patient's drug-seeking behavior when prescribing controlled substances); Dolenz v. Texas
State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, No. 03-98-00116-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5152, at *13 (Tex. Ct.
App. Jul. 15,1999) (upholding suspension of license because physician failed to keep accurate
medical records supporting necessity of using controlled substances, and failed to record
purchases and disposals of controlled substances); McFadden v. Mississippi State Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 735 So. 2d 145, 161 (Miss. 1999) (upholding board's decision to suspend because
physician failed to keep adequate medical records, failed to record prescriptions in patients'
charts and continued to refill prescriptions without conducting any subsequent examination
of patients); Carloni v. New York Dept. of Health, 245 A.D.2d 970, 972 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(upholding license revocation for failing to maintain adequate records, and improperly
prescribing controlled substances without performing adequate physical examination before
prescribing narcotics); Holladay v. Louisiana Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 689 So. 2d 718, 724-25 (La.
Ct. App. 1997) (upholding suspension of physician's license because physician continuously
prescribed controlled drugs in absence of any treatment plan, failed to conduct any
subsequent examinations, failed to maintain adequate medical records and prescribed
controlled substances for long-term use to patients with documented history of drug and/or
alcohol abuse); Howard v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 870 F. Supp. 340, 346 (D. Ga. 1994)
(upholding state's order for physician to surrender his DEA certificate and suspending
privileges to prescribe controlled substances because physician prescribed narcotics to known
drug addicts).
45 In these decisions, many of the courts discussed expert medical testimony introduced
by either party at the administrative hearings regarding the efficacy of long-term use of
opioids in treating chronic intractable pain. See Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1382; Johnson, 456 So. 2d
at 942; McFadden, 735 So. 2d at 149; Holladay, 689 So. 2d at 725-26; McNeil, 1997 Tenn. App.
LEXIS, at *22-29; DiLeo, 661 So. 2d at 165-67. In fact, the Holladay court paid particular
attention to the state's expert, and enumerated several factors deemed important that
physicians should follow in treating intractable pain with opioids. See Holladay, 689 So. 2d at
725. None of the courts disputed the use of opioids as appropriate care in treating chronic
intractable pain. The conclusion follows that the courts believed that long-term use of opioids
fell squarely within accepted medical practice in treating chronic pain as long as physicians
followed acceptable medical standards of diagnosis, charting and follow-up regarding these
patients.
2000] OPIATES FOR CHRONIC PAIN
regulatory sanction.46
C. Cultural and Attitudinal Barriers
Americans feel that the chronic use of narcotics should be
avoided.47 Historically, narcotics have been associated with opium
dens and drug addicts.48 The core of this problem is the failure of
medical professionals to distinguish between physical dependence
and addiction in the use of opioid medications.49
Physicians, nurses and other health care professionals have often
been identified as those most responsible for the undertreatment of
chronic pain.50 Their attitudes, practice patterns, and lack of
46 See Martino, supra note 9, at 339-41 (describing physician's concern with loss of internal
and external rewards of practice).
47 See David F. Musto, Physicians Attitudes Toward Narcotics, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN
RESEARCH AND THERAPY 51, 54-55 (describing shifts in attitude toward narcotics at turn of
century); see also Reuven Dar et al., Cancer Pain in the Marital System: A Study of Patients and
Their Spouses, 7 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 87, 90 (1992) (showing that 69% of cancer pain
patients surveyed endorsed statement that "I feel I should not take narcotic medications on a
regular basis but only when the pain is extreme"); Finn, supra note 41, at 121-22 (explaining
ambivalence toward narcotic use); Shannon Brownlee, The Quality of Mercy: Effective Pain
Treatments Already Exist: Why Aren't Doctors Using Them? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar.
17, 1997, at 55-57, 60-65 (explaining that patients contribute to their own misery because of
attitudes toward narcotics).
48 See Charles R. Schuster, Does Treatment of Cancer Pain With Narcotics Produce Junkies? 11
ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 1, 1-2 (describing misperceptions surrounding
chronic pain patient and street junkie); see also Musto, supra note 47, at 55.
49 See Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Clinicians'
Perspective, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 296, 300-03; Hill, supra note 12, at 292; see also Kathleen M.
Foley, The "Decriminalization" of Cancer Pain, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 5,
7 (1989). The fear of addiction stems from a confusion within the medical community and
among the general public with respect to physical dependence, psychological dependence and
tolerance when administering narcotics. Id. Physical dependence describes the symptoms
associated with withdrawal when an opioid is suddenly stopped. Tolerance describes the
effect that larger doses of a medication may be needed to produce the same pain relief for the
patient because the disease has progressed or the patient's neuron response has built a
resistance to the drug. Psychological dependence describes a pattern of drug use characterized
by a continued craving for a drug, manifested by compulsive behavior aimed at doing
whatever it takes to procure a new supply. Id.
Rarely do chronic pain patients develop the symptoms of psychological dependence or
addiction. See J. Porter & H. Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 123 (1980). The authors found only four cases of documented addiction among over
eleven thousand patients treated with at least one dosage of opioids. Id. See also Russell K.
Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of
38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171-86 (1986).
It is thought that the mechanism associated with severe pain exhausts the effects of
opioids, thus the patient rarely experiences any euphoria or "high" when using these
medications. See Brownlee, supra note 47, at 57. Yet this confusion persists within the medical
community over physical and psychological dependence, leading to under-prescribing. Id.
50 See Margo McCaffery & Betty R. Ferrell, Nurses' Knowledge of Pain Assessment and
Management: How Much Progress Have We Made?, 14 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 168, 170-78
(1997) (showing that gaps still exist in nurses' perceptions and management of pain patients);
Barbara S. Shapiro et al., Sickle Cell-Related Pain: Perceptions of Medical Practitioners, 14 J. PAIN &
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knowledge are the problem.5 1 Most healthcare professionals lack the
education and training necessary for the use of opioids to treat
chronic pain.52
Evidence of this phenomenon is illustrated by a 1991 survey of
861 oncologists conducted by the Eastern Cooperative Oncology
Group. This study revealed that just over 10% said they had
received good to excellent pain management training in medical
school, and only 50% felt pain management was good to excellent in
their own hospital settings.5 3 In fact, these surveys show that the
lack of education and training on pain management is endemic
within the health care professions.5 4
Reports also suggest that physician "opiophobia" leads to the
undertreatment of pain.55 Physicians are overly concerned with the
use of narcotics for fear of their patients becoming addicted to these
medications. 56 In spite of the growing body of evidence that
SYMPTOM MGMT. 168,171-74 (1997) (finding that 53% of emergency room physicians and 23 %
of hematologists thought that more than 20 % of patients in this subject class were addicted to
pain medications); see also Francoise LaRue et al., Underestimation and Undertreatment of Pain in
HIV Disease: Multicenter Study, 314 BRITISH MED. J. 23, 23-28 (1997) (showing that physicians
routinely underestimate and under treat pain in HIV patients); Richard M. Marks & Edward J.
Sachar, Undertreatnent of Medical Inpatients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS INTERN. MED.
173, 173-81 (1973) (documenting poor pain treatment for post-operative surgical patients).
51 See Turk, supra note 11, at 224-28 (describing results of national survey of physicians
and their differing perceptions on treating chronic pain patients); see also Rebecca A. Drayer et
al., Barriers to Better Pain Control in Hospitalized Patients, 17 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 434, 437-
38 (confirming prior findings that physicians and nurses consistently underestimate severity
of patients' pain).
52 See Joanne E. Mortimer & Nancy L. Bartlett, Assessment of Knowledge About Cancer Pain
Management by Physicians in Training, 14 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 21, 25-28 (1997) (showing
that graduate medical students were not adequately trained in pain assessment or
management, and had lack of understanding in pharmacological advantages and side effects
associated with opioid medications).
53 See Diane M. Gianelli, Lack of Proper Pain Management Big Problem for Dying Patients, 36
AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS 57 (1993). Cf. Paul A. Sloan et al., Cancer Pain Education Among
Family Physicians, 14 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 74, 78-80 (1997) (suggesting that many family
physicians have inadequate skills in assessing and managing cancer pain).
54 See McCaffery & Ferrell, supra note 50; Mortimer & Bartlett, supra note 52; see also Brian
D. Greenwald & Elizabeth J. Narcessian, Opioids for Managing Patients with Chronic Pain:
Community Pharmacists' Perspectives and Concerns, 17 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 369, 373 (1999)
(showing pharmacists share common misperceptions regarding tolerance, physical
dependence and addiction with opioids).
55 See Martino, supra note 9, at 336 (attributing "opiophobia" to principles at work in
physicians' under-prescribing of opioids); John P. Morgan & Karoline S. Puder, Postoperative
Analgesia: Variations in Prescribed and Administered Opioid Dosages, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN
RESEARCH AND THERAPY 175,178 (1989) (coining term and describing phobia).
56 See John P. Morgan, American Opiophobia: Customary Underutilization of Opioid
Analgesics, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 181, 186-88 (1989) (describing this
concern); see also Foley, supra note 49; Portenoy, supra note 3; Schuster, supra note 48; Shapiro
et al., supra note 50. But see Stein, supra note 11, at 913 (questioning safety of long-term opioid
use); Turk, supra note 11, at 220-23 (pointing out that addiction rate in some studies
approached 10%); Brownlee, supra note 47.
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supports the efficacy of treating chronic pain with opioids, the
opiophobes have resisted education and training on the clinical uses
of opioids, and have avoided the effects of these decisions by
neglecting the proper assessment of pain.57 The under-treatment of
chronic pain is a result of ignorance and neglect rather than poor
education.5 8
Physicians have learned to prescribe medications chiefly by
custom, 59  and they regulate their prescribing behavior by
comparison with their peers. The problem with customary behavior
is that people frequently ignore the results of such behavior. 60 The
adherence to customary behavior among physicians is pervasive,
and involves an ethic within the medical establishment to avoid
risks.61
None of these perceived threats attach when a physician under-
treats a chronic pain patient.62 Physicians have been sanctioned for
the over-prescription of opioids, yet have never been disciplined for
the under-prescription of these medications.63 Since under-treating
pain has been the accepted practice within the medical community,
peers have exerted minimal pressure to change the norm.64
Therefore, some external incentive is needed to alter physician-
prescribing practices from the customary undertreatment of pain to
the appropriate level.
57 See id. See also Drayer et al., supra note 51; LaRue et al., supra note 50; Marks & Sachar,
supra note 50; Mortimer & Bartlett, supra note 52; Porter & Jick, supra note 49; Portenoy &
Foley, supra note 49.
58 See Morgan, supra note 56, at 188 (disputing claim that undertreatment results from
poor education or training but from conscious choice physicians make to undertreat); see also
Charles S. Cleeland, Pain Control: Pnblic and Physicians' Attitudes, 11 ADVANCES IN PAIN
RESEARCH AND THERAPY 81, 82-84 (1989) (echoing similar sentiments and attitudes among
sample of physicians in Wisconsin study).
59 See Peter Temin, Physician Prescribing Behavior: Is There Learning by Doing?, in DRUGS
AND HEALTH, 173, 173-82 (R.J. Helms ed. 1981).
60 See id.
61 See Martino, supra note 9, at 334, 336-342 (explaining how ethics form and describing
both internal and external rewards that force conformity to norms).
62 See id.
63 See supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text. See also Martino, supra note 9, at 346
(notn that "not a single case is on record in which a medical board has taken a formal
discipliny action against a physician for underprescribing"). But see Rich, supra note 9, at 84
& n.439 (noting that first case of this kind has been filed in California, captioned as, Bergman
v. Chin, No. I205732-1 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct., Feb. 16, 1999)).
64 See Cleeland, supra note 58, at 82; Martino, supra note 9, at 339-341 (describing how
institutionalized pressures reinforce ethic of under-prescribing).
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II. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Theory of the Cause of Action: The Prima Facie Case
In an action for medical malpractice the plaintiff must show that
the physician (1) owed a duty of reasonable care in providing
medical treatment to the patient; (2) the breach of this duty by the
physician by failing to exercise reasonable care; (3) that the breach of
duty proximately caused the patient's injury; and (4) that the
plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the physician's negligence.65
Courts have universally held that a physician owes a legal duty of
care to his patient.66 The origin of this legal duty arises either
through contract or through a consensual fiduciary relationship
between the parties.67 Once a physician agrees to treat a patient
he/she must do so skillfully. The legal duty requires a physician to
use reasonable care, skill and judgment in treating the patient,
holding him/her liable for injury to the patient arising from lack of
the requisite knowledge, skill or the failure to exercise reasonable
care.
68
The threshold question in medical malpractice litigation is: "What
is the standard of care?" Unlike other areas of negligence law where
the task of defining the applicable standard of care is left to the
judge or jury, courts in medical malpractice actions have delegated
65 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-68(5th ed. 1984). See also Knight v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Strother v.
Hutchinson, 423 N.E. 2d 467 (Ohio 1981) (per curium); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1965).
66 See Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549,
553-55 (1959) (discussing duty and citing cases).
67 See Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Conn. 1998)
(arising from consensual relationship); Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991)
(contractual duty); J.A.H. v. Wadle Assoc., 598 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Iowa 1999) (arising from
contract); United Calendar Mfg. Corp. v. Huang, 94 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(consensual not contract); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 202 (1981) ("The duty of
a physician or surgeon to bring skill and care to the amelioration of the condition of his
patient does not arise from contract, but has its foundation in public considerations which are
inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling ....").
68 See Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y. 1898); see also Rickett v. Hayes, 511 S.W.2d
187, 194 (Ark. 1974); Hesler v. Calif. Hosp. Co., 174 P. 654, 655 (Cal. 1918); Stacy v. Williams,
69 S.W.2d 697, 704 (Ky. 1934); Hall v. Hillburn, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985); Owens v.
McCleary, 281 S.W. 682, 685 (Mo. 1926); Hansen v. Pock, 187 P. 282, 284 (Mont. 1920); McBride
v. Huckins, 81 A. 528, 530 (N.H. 1911); Nash v. Royster, 127 S.E. 356, 359 (N.C. 1925); Littleton
v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Center, 529 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ohio 1988); Hodgson v.
Bigelow, 7 A.2d 338, 343 (Pa. 1939); Bigney v. Fisher, 59 A. 72, 72 (R.I. 1904); Mullin v.
Flanders, 50 A. 813, 814 (Vt. 1901); Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534, 538 (Wyo. 1989).
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this task to the medical profession.69
Courts have granted great deference to physicians by allowing
them to establish their own legal standard of conduct.70 This
deference shown the medical profession stands in stark contrast to
ordinary negligence actions where adherence to customary practices
is merely evidence of reasonableness.71
To satisfy this legal standard a physician need only comply with
the customary practices within the profession.72 This standard,
however, leaves physicians free to practice by force of habit, which
may not necessarily reflect a "good standard of care." 73 A physician
who is only responsible for following and keeping up with
customary practice standards has little incentive to improve his/her
skills beyond a level of minimum competency.74 Blind adherence to
custom thwarts the adoption of innovative advances in medical
science, and a new technique or clinical improvement cannot, by
definition, be customary until the general medical community has
adopted it.75
Expert testimony, usually introduced by both parties, has been
required to establish whether the defendant's conduct has complied
with or deviated from the customary practices within the medical
profession.76 Under the cause of action proposed in this Note, the
plaintiff would be required to call an expert witness to testify that
the standard of care in treating chronic pain called for the use of
opioid medications, and the physician's omission or reluctance to
institute this type of treatment represented sub-standard care. This
may prove to be a daunting task due to the judicial deference courts
have granted to the medical profession-allowing customary
practices to define the appropriate standard of care.77 This
69 See McCoid, supra note 66, at 606; see also Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528 (1976).
70 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 32 at 189; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A.
Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical
Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384 (1994).
71 See McCoid, supra note 66, at 606.
72 See Henderson & Silicano, supra note 65, at 1384; McCoid, supra note 66, at 606.
73 See W. Page Keeton, Medical Negligence - The Standard of Care, 10 TEX. TECH L. REv. 351,
354 (1979).
74 See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 70, at 1390-91.
75 See id. at 1395.
76 See Keeton, supra note 73, at 351.
77 See I BARRY R. FuRROw ET AL., HEALTH LAW, § 6-2 at 361 (1995) (explaining that "[m]ost
jurisdictions give professional medical standards conclusive weight, so that the trier of fact is
not allowed to reject the practice as improper").
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adherence to custom would leave the plaintiff with the unenviable
task of proving that the standard of practice in the profession is
unreasonable.78
The legal consequence of such deference has cost society. The
current standard in medical malpractice actions has failed to
adequately compensate victims of medical negligence, or act as an
incentive to the profession to raise standards of medical care. 79
Furthermore, the litigation costs have often prohibited worthy
plaintiffs from receiving relief because highly expensive medical
experts has been needed to testify in an attempt to establish the
proper medical standard.80 These experts have become hired guns
within this legal arena, and their testimony should be suspect
because they invariably agree with whichever side has payed their
bill.81 The dissatisfaction with the current system has led to a call
for the use of practice guidelines in establishing the standard of care
in medical malpractice litigation.82 Historically, courts have been
reluctant to accept medical practice guidelines as the standard of
care. Some courts, however, have allowed the admission of such
guidelines, viewing them as neutral and unbiased evidence on the
issue.83
78 See Neil Meltzer, Helling v. Carey: Landmark or Exception in Medical Malpractice, 11 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 301, 308 (1975).
79 See Deborah W. Gamick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and Costs of
Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2856-60 (1991) (stressing that current malpractice system
fails to compensate injured patients); Russell A. LoCalio et al., Relation Between Malpractice
Claims and Adverse Events due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 245-51 (1991) (reporting
that 95% of adverse events due to negligence do not result in malpractice claims). See generally
R.H. Brooks et al., The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DuKE
L.J. 1197, 1197-1231 (1975) (discussing fact that current threat of malpractice liability provides
weak incentive for doctors to elevate their standard of care).
80 See Maxwell J. Mellman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome
Measurements and Practice Standards, 18 L. MED. & HEALTHCARE 368, 376 (1990) (noting that
experts in malpractice cases rarely agree and confuse juries, and advocating for use of
standard practice guidelines); William R. Trail & Brad A. Allen, Practice Guidelines: The
Opening of Pandora's Box, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 245 (1995) (describing criticisms leveled at use
of medical expert testimony).
81 See Garnick, supra note 79, at 2857 (referring to "hired gun" analogy in malpractice
litigation); Gary W. Kuc, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician Liability, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 439, 442 (1994) (describing experts as "hired guns"); Trail &
Allen, supra note 80, at 24546 (listing "hired gun" analogy within criticisms of experts).
82 See Kuc, supra note 81, at 442; Mellman, supra note 80, at 376-79; Trail & Allen, supra
note 80, at 242-43; see also Richard Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard
of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989)
(advocating adoption of practice guidelines as standard of care); Robyn S. Shapiro, Health Care
Provider Liability Exposure for Inappropriate Pain Management, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 360, 361-62
(1996) (calling for use of guidelines as measure of standard of care in treating chronic pain).
83 See Garnick et al., supra note 79, at 2858 (describing relationship between guidelines
and litigation); Trail & Allen, supra note 80, at 245 (describing same).
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In Pollard v. Goldsmith,84 a patient died from a tetanus infection
because the physician failed to administer tetanus human-immune
globulin after a serious injury. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant finding that the physician could not
have breached the duty of care.85 The Arizona Court of Appeals
reversed, based on the defendant's deposition testimony, where he
admitted that he accepted as authority the guidelines issued by the
Committee on Trauma of the American College of Surgeons. 86 The
guidelines clearly stated that human-immune globulin should be
administered to patients "with wounds which indicate an
overwhelming possibility that tetanus will develop." 87  The
defendant testified that he did not believe there was an
overwhelming possibility that tetanus would develop in the victim.
In Roach v. Springfield Clinic,88 the court took one step further in a
case involving the admissibility of a publication by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG"). The
defendant physicians admitted that they were familiar with the
guidelines and acknowledged that obstetricians commonly used the
publication to prepare for their certification examinations. 89 The
court held that they were admissible, noting that the guidelines
constituted a relevant industry standard of care. 90 If a court allows
one party to admit guidelines as evidence of the standard of care, it
would follow that the opposing party should be given the
opportunity to rebut that standard.91 This situation occurred in the
blood bank cases during the 1980's. Blood banks around the
country faced a growing crisis because of the emerging awareness of
the potential spread of the HIV virus through blood transfusions.92
84 572 P.2d 1201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
85 See id. at 1203.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 585 N.E.2d 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1993).
89 See id. at 1079.
90 See id. (noting that relevant industry standards are admissible to show standard of care
in negligence action).
91 See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: A Two-Way
Street, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 450, 454-55 (1995) (reporting that guidelines are currently
being used for inculpatory as well as exculpatory purposes in medical malpractice litigation).
92 See Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among Persons with
Hemophilia A, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 365, 365-67 (1982) (describing three cases
where persons with hemophilia who received blood transfusions developed AIDS); Center for
Disease Control, Possible Transfiision-Associated Acquired Immune Deficien y Syndrome, 31
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 652, 652-54 (1982) (reporting that infant who had received
multiple transfusions at birth developed AIDS).
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Some of these centers ignored the warnings of AIDS specialists, and
resisted implementing more stringent screening and testing
procedures to ensure blood products were not contaminated with
HIV.93 Plaintiffs who had subsequently contracted the HIV virus
from transfusions of tainted blood initiated actions against these
blood centers claiming professional negligence. 94 In United Blood
Services v. Quintana,95 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
defendant blood bank was negligent by adhering to out-dated
professional standards existing in government guidelines. 96
Prior to trial, United Blood Services ("UBS") successfully argued
that the expert testimony of AIDS specialists lacked scientific
validity and should not be received by the jury.97 At trial, UBS
showed that it met or exceeded all federal standards issued by the
Food and Drug Administration, and followed all of the applicable
guidelines for the regulation of blood banks issued by the American
Association of Blood Banks and the Red Cross.98 The trial judge
instructed the jury that if they found that UBS did comply with the
professional standards, then this finding would be conclusive proof
that UBS was not negligent.99 Based on these instructions, the jury
found for UBS.100
On appeal, UBS argued against implementation on the new
standards advocated by AIDS specialists, claiming that any
additional interrogation of donors would be intrusive and would
violate their right to privacy.101 They argued that the scientific
evidence was less than conclusive in showing that HIV could be
transmitted via blood transfusions.102 Moreover, they feared that
implementing these policies would reduce the number of willing
donors, and that the negative publicity (the potential for infection
93 See Kosup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1057-58 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in
relevant part, vacated in part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to hold blood bank liable for
failure to employ surrogate testing where no governmental or medical organization required
these tests for IfV screening); see also Doe v. Miles Lab., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 1991);
Osborn v. Irmin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101,128-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
94 See id.
95 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
96 See id. at 522-24.
97 See id. at 512 (discussing factual history).
98 See id. at 516-17.
99 See id. at 517-18 (detailing jury instructions given at trial).
100 See id.at518.
101 See id. at 512-16 (describing controversy surrounding HIV transmission through blood
donations).
102 See id.
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from transfusions) would drive potential clients away from not-for-
profit centers toward source plasma centers, which used the
stringent screening processes recommended by AIDS experts.103
The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed. In its opinion the court
stated:
In a professional negligence case, therefore, a plaintiff should be
permitted to present expert opinion testimony that the standard
of care adopted by the school of practice to which the defendant
adheres is unreasonably deficient by not incorporating readily
available practices and procedures substantially more
protective against the harm caused to the plaintiff than the
standard of care adopted by the defendant's school of
practice.104
The court held that if the standard of care within an existing
profession has not been updated with current scientific data, a court
could admit evidence that shows that the continued adherence to
the standard is negligent.105 Plaintiffs should be afforded an
opportunity to rebut a claim that traditionally accepted practices
within a profession constitute the standard of due care when new
relevant scientific data indicates that the standard should be
heightened. 106 The decision in this case was instrumental in
changing the practices of blood banks around the country,
benefiting society as a whole by guaranteeing a safer blood
supply.107
When applying the same reasoning to chronic pain patients, it
becomes apparent that the traditional standard of care of under-
prescribing opioid medication is negligent. In this cause of action,
the use of guidelines as evidence of the standard of care may allow a
plaintiff's claim to survive a summary judgment motion.
Medical practice guidelines have been proposed and adopted by
several states as a major component for tort reform in medical
malpractice actions.108 When properly used, these guidelines can
103 See id. at 512-15 (discussing stringent donor screening programs instituted by source
plasma centers in response to concern that blood transfusions could transmit HIV).
104 See United Blood Sew., 827 P.2d at 521.
105 See id. at 525-26 (finding that adherence to deficient custom or practice may itself be
negligent conduct).
106 See Hyams, supra note 91, at 454-55.
107 See Tom Abate, Genetic Bloodhound/New Test From Rival Bay Area Finns Can Sniff Out
Viral Infections in Donations, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 1999 at El (chronicling advances made in
late eighties that insured safe blood supply).
108 See Trail & Allen, supra note 80, at 235.
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reduce defensive medicine and the frequency of medical malpractice
claims by providing physicians with an affirmative defense.109 The
American Medical Association and the General Accounting Office
have strongly endorsed the adoption of medical practice guidelines
as an objective standard to assess claims raised in malpractice.110
States experimenting with this process have adopted different
approaches. For example, the Maine Board of Registration in
Medicine promulgated guidelines that have the full effect of law.111
The goals of the Maine statute are to: (1) create practice parameters
for defined specialties; (2) avoid malpractice claims; and (3) increase
the defensibility of malpractice claims by creating an affirmative
defense for doctors who substantially complied with the published
guidelines.112 In Maine, a physician can introduce these guidelines
as the appropriate standard of care, and plead an affirmative
defense to any malpractice charges if he or she can show substantial
compliance with the guidelines.113 Courts in Maine are required to
instruct juries that the guidelines are the standard of care in
determining malpractice. 114
Florida has adopted a similar approach, and the state Agency for
Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is required to develop
practice guidelines that physicians can voluntarily use as protection
against malpractice claims.115 However, unlike the Maine statute
that expressly prohibits a plaintiff from introducing the guidelines
as part of their case-in-chief, the Florida statute is silent regarding
the plaintiff's ability to use the guidelines against the physician in
proving a malpractice claim.
There is concern in Florida that this omission will lead to
increased litigation.116 The overarching purpose of these statutes
was to create a shield for physicians in defending claims for
negligence, and not to provide a sword to plaintiffs in pursuing
109 See id. at 233, n.17.
110 See id. at 241, nn. 67-68.
111 See Kuc, supra note 81, at 439. See generally Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice
Guidelines: Inplicationsfor Medical Malpractice Litigation, 47 ME. L. REV. 69 (1995).
112 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West 1999).
113 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2855 (West 1999) (creating affirmative defense by
showing compliance with guidelines).
114 See Begel, supra note 111, at 82-88 (discussing use of guidelines at different stages of
litigation).
115 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.02 (West 1998).
116 See Trail & Allen, supra note 80, at 246, n.104; see also Hyams, supra note 91, at 454
(showing that plaintiff's attorneys are likely to use guidelines when there is clear deviation
from standard).
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these actions.117 A compromise would allow the plaintiff to offer the
guidelines adopted by the AHCA as evidence of the standard of
care, but non-compliance by a physician would not create a prima
facia case of negligence.118 The physician would still be allowed to
use compliance with the adopted guidelines as conclusive proof that
he/she practiced within the standard of care and juries would be
instructed that a finding that the physician followed the guidelines
would preclude any finding of negligence.119
Both parties may face problems using guidelines that the medical
establishment has not accepted as the standard of care within the
medical institution.120  Guidelines, especially clinical practice
guidelines, which reflect optimal or ideal treatment, measure the
physician's conduct against too high a standard.'21 The use of
guidelines at trial would still require the use of experts, since both
parties would need someone to explain how the guidelines apply to
the defendant's conduct.1 22 The guidelines would, however, supply
the jury with a neutral, impartial tool in assessing the credibility of
each party's expert.
A recent study shows that plaintiffs use practice guidelines in
medical malpractice disputes more often than physicians.123 The
117 See Begel, supra note 111, at 72-75 (discussing purpose for guideline use in medical
malpractice litigation).
118 See Trail & Allen, supra note 75, at 247 (discussing compromise).
119 See Hyams, supra note 91, at 454-55. The authors point out that the most significant
finding of the study showed that both parties to the litigation employed guidelines as
evidence of the standard of care. Id. at 454. Allowing this process to continue may in fact be
the best way to employ guidelines. For example, cases where plaintiffs can show a clear
deviation from a widely accepted guideline are likely to settle rather than continue through
the protracted process and expense of a jury verdict. In addition, a plaintiff's attorney who
knows there is little chance of prevailing on the claim will not pursue cases where a defendant
clearl complied with an accepted guideline. Id. at 455.
120 See Garnick, et al., supra note 79, at 2856-58. The authors explain that in order for
guidelines to be an effective tool in reducing malpractice claims, they should be developed for
events that frequently lead to malpractice claims, widely accepted in the medical community
as the standard of care, and straightforward and easily interpreted by juries in any litigation.
Id. Reasons for physician resistance to adopting guidelines in clinical settings have been
explored by scholars. See Michael D. Cabana et al., Wy Don't Physicians Follow Clinical Practice
Guidelines?, 282 JAMA 1458, 1463 (1999).
121 See Trail & Allen, supra note 80, at 245-53. The authors point out that in many instances
the clinical guidelines that have been developed reflect the optimal standard of care in
treatment or diagnosis of a particular condition. Following such a guideline as the standard of
care in medical malpractice would arguably be the wrong approach. A physician is liable in
tort for malpractice when his conduct falls below a minimal acceptable standard of care.
Holding all physicians to an optimal standard would mean that more than half of all
physicians would be liable for sub-standard care. This standard would create a system of
strict liability for physicians, which would be self-defeating. Id.
122 See Garnick et al., supra note 79, at 2859; Hyams, supra note 91, at 454.
123 See Hyams, supra note 91, at 454 (finding guidelines were twice as likely to be used by
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study also suggests that the growing use and acceptance of
guidelines as evidence of the standard of care may have the
beneficial effects of reducing the overall number of claims brought
against physicians, and facilitate the early settlement of these
disputes without resorting to trial.124 These improvements are
necessary for our system which is now fundamentally flawed by the
reliance of custom as the measure of the standard of care.125
In order to prevail in a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff
must also show that he/she was injured and that the defendant
caused that injury.126 The causation element needs careful
consideration in this proposed cause of action.127 The plaintiff
cannot reasonably contend that the physician caused the initial pain.
Instead, the plaintiff would claim that the defendant's negligence
was a substantial factor in prolonging and increasing the plaintiff's
pain - by doing so the defendant deprived the patient of a
reasonable chance at a better result.128 The plaintiff would be
required to show that the physician's neglect or refusal to use opioid
medications caused this lost chance. 129 Courts that recognize the loss
plaintiffs than by defendants in malpractice litigation).
124 See id.
125 See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 70, at 1392-94 (describing flaws that exist in
current system); LoCalio, supra note 79, at 245-50 (detailing abysmal results of current system
in compensating victims of medical negligence).
126 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 65, § 30 at 164-65; Robert S. Bruer, Loss of a Chance as a
Cause of Action in Medical Malpractice Cases, 59 Mo. L. REV. 969, 971 (1994) (discussing tort
causation); Christopher M. Hohn, Cause-in-Fact in Missouri: Return to Normalcy, 59 MO. L. REV.
947, 947 (1994) (stating that plaintiff must prove defendant caused harm); see also Bill Charles
Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claimsfor Damages From Toxic Exposure Without Present Injury,
18 WM. & MARYJ. ENvTL. L. 285,287 (1994) (indicating elements needed for tort liability).
127 See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1360-63 (1981)
(distinguishing between causation element and valuation element in lost chance medical
malpractice claims); see also Hon. Helen E. Freedman, Product Liability Issues in Mass Torts -
View From the Bench, 15 TOuRO L. REV. 685, 690 (1999) (discussing tort causation in products
liability); Allan Kanner, Environmental Justice, Torts and Causation, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 511
(1995) (discussing causation in environmental claims).
128 See Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for Human
Life, 42 S.D. L. REv. 279, 284 6997); see also William M. Brandt & John H. Guthmann, Recovery
for the Value of a Chance in Medical Negligence Cases: Bringing Minnesota's Standard of Causation
Up to Date, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 459,474 (1986); Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern
Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 765 (1992) (examining loss of
chance theory).
129 See Estate of James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89CVS64 (N.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 20, 1990)
(recognizing that prolonged and additional pain caused by negligence of nurse represented
injury to plaintiff); see also Continued Care, Inc., v. Fournet, 979 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (Burgess, J., dissenting) (discussing proximate cause in similar circumstances). See
generally Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongfid Living Cause of
Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 637 (1986) (explaining proximate cause and valuation in analogous
cause of action).
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of chance doctrine and provide the patient with a means of recovery
view the compensable injury as the diminished or destroyed
opportunity for a more desirable medical result, not the undesirable
result itself.130 The plaintiff must only prove that the deprivation
more likely than not prevented a better result.131 Underlying the
lost chance doctrine, the basic premise is that "[n]o matter how
small that chance may have been, and its magnitude cannot be
ascertained, no one can say that the chance of prolonging one's life
or decreasing suffering is valueless."132
The liability of a physician should extend only to the portion of
the patient's harm caused by the physician and not include any
injury/harm the patient suffered prior to the physician's
treatment.133 The valuation of the injury would have to be
discounted due to the pre-existing condition that caused the chronic
pain.134 This may prove to be a difficult task since opioid therapy
may not have relieved the pain, or only provided marginal relief
compared with the therapy the physician did employ.135
130 The loss of chance doctrine has typically been applied in cases where a patient dies
prematurely due to the preexisting condition. This Note would stress that an extension of that
doctrine can apply in cases where the failure to treat the patient with opioid medication
prolonged the patient's pain. For a thorough listing of jurisdictions recognizing the lost chance
doctrine, and the corresponding theories surrounding its application, see Crosby v. United
States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924, 927-29, nn.13-16 (D. Alaska 1999) (listing cases and jurisdictions);
John D. Hodson, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 A.L.R.4 th 10 (1987)
(reviewing major cases); Mangan, supra note 128, at 290, n.117 (listing cases and jurisdictions
recognizing doctrine); Martin J. McMahon, Medical Malpractice: Measure and Elements of
Damages in Actions Bases on Loss of Chance, 81 A.L.R.4th 485 (1990) (reviewing cases).
131 See Mayhue v. Sparkman, 627 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), vacated by
Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384 (Ind. 1995) (stating "the plaintiff is required to show
that it is more likely than not that the physician deprived the patient of some chance of a
better result or recovery absent the malpractice"); see also Stephen F. Brennwald, Proving
Causation in "Loss of a Chance" Cases: A Proportional Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 748-51
(1995) (indicating that liability attaches when tortfeasor causes individual to lose chance to
avoid harm); Michelle L. Truckor, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for Patients on the
Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1999) (explaining doctrine). See generally
Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance of Survival Doctrine: Should the Courts Ever Tinker with
Chance?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 421, 422-23 (1992) (discussing history of loss of chance doctrine).
132 See James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that
plaintiffs met burden of proving that patient would have benefited from earlier medical
treatment).
133 See Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. 1992) (recognizing that
"aggravation of a preexisting condition" is legitimate damage measure where damages occur
to patient for already present condition); Bruer, supra note 109, at 973-74; King, supra note 127,
at 1356-60; Mangan, supra note 128, at 284, 310.
134 See Sterner, 493 N.W.2d at 122; Oddi, supra note 109, at 639-40; see also Dillon v. Twin
State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. 111 (1932) (explaining damage valuation when court encounters
multiple, concurrent causes); Bruer, supra note 109 (discussing valuation issue).
135 See Brownlee, supra note 47, at 59. A physician can never guarantee that opioids will
either totally or partially relieve certain conditions. For example, there are several conditions
where narcotics offer little if any relief for patient's pain. Examples of such conditions include
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The elements of causation and damages may be deemed too
speculative to meet the plaintiff's burden of proof in establishing a
prima facie case.136 In Corbin v. Wilson,137 the patient had an
underlying illness that would continue to create episodes of
moderate to severe pain even when properly diagnosed and treated
with pain medication. The court struggled to determine how much
of the patient's continued pain and suffering was attributable to the
underlying disease and the amount caused by the physician's
alleged negligence in not instituting opioid therapy. The Corbin
court avoided the issue by declaring, "pain is of course incapable of
exact pecuniary compensation in any case." 138
B. Probable Defense Counter-Arguments
The prima facie case is vulnerable to attack through the standard
of care, causation, and the damage elements of the cause of action.
Defense counsel would rely on both precedent and factual argument
to counter such claims.
1. Standard of Care
There is no disputing that over the last ten years researchers have
made progress in documenting the efficacy of long-term use of
opioids in treating chronic, non-malignant pain.139 Yet most of the
studies conducted to date dealt with the use of long-term opioid
therapy with terminally ill and cancer patients. Although
similarities exist between chronic patients and cancer patients they
are not exact and the medical research for the proper long-term use
of opioid medication in chronic patients has not been as
enlightening as research done on cancer patients.140 Guidelines that
pain associated with nerve damage such as shingles, diabetes, cancer and AIDS, which may
not respond to opioid therapy. Id.; see also David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician-
Assisted Suicide After Gluksberg/Quil, 9 ALB. L.J. So. & TECH. 161, 205-07 (1999). Opioids and
other medications are often inadequate to control pain. Id.
136 See Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1991); Bromine v. Pavitt, 7
Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); White v. Methodist Hosp. South, 844 S.W.2d 642,
649 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Edward J. McCaffery et al, Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on
Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1398 (1995) (noting that measurement of pain
and suffering damages are highly variable).
137 See Wilson v. Corbin, 41 N.W.2d 702, 708 (Iowa 1950) (examining patient's pain after
physician failed to diagnose fracture).
138 See id.
139 See Portenoy, supra note 11, at S46-S62; Portenoy, supra note 49, at 300-03; Portenoy &
Foley, supra note 49, at 171-86; Porter & Jick, supra note 49, at 123; Zenz, supra note 11.
140 See Portenoy, snpra note 49, at 297-98; Stein, snpra note 11, at 913; Turk, supra note 11,
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currently exist for treatment of chronic, non-malignant pain serve as
useful models but they have not as of yet gained any widespread
acceptance within the medical community.141 One factor that has
exacerbated this problem has been that general practice physicians
have rarely seen the majority of chronic patients.142 Chronic patients
treated by pain specialists differ markedly from acute pain patients
who have usually been followed by general practitioners.143 Patients
referred to pain centers have had higher levels of psychological
distress, more frequent psychiatric problems, greater functional
impairment, more work-related injuries, more frequent use of health
care services, and more frequent reports of constant pain without
pain-free periods. Furthermore, they have most likely been taking
opioid medications prescribed by their primary care physician.144
Moreover, studies have shown that the majority of patients who
suffer from chronic pain have not sought treatment for their
conditions. Little has been learned about them.145
Although the dangers associated in the use of opioids may be
overstated, these medications can pose significant risks to
patients.146 Most of the data on the use of opioids in chronic, non-
malignant pain have been non-randomized, retrospective studies
that have subjectively measured patient response.147 Current studies
at 219-21.
141 See Martino, supra note 9, at 333 (describing physicians resistance to use of narcotics in
treating chronic, non-malignant pain); Pratt, supra note 135, at 205-07 (discussing inadequate
measures taken to control pain); see also Alpers, supra note 10, at 309 (noting knowledge
deficiency among physicians in treating pain).
142 See Turk, supra note 11, at 220; see also Preben Bendtsen et al., What Are the Qualities of
Dilemmas Experienced Mien Prescribing Opioids in General Practice?, 82 PAIN 89, 89-96 (1998)
(describing lower incidence of treating chronic pain in general practice and different
diagnostic and treatment decisions faced by general practitioners).
143 Compare Bendtsen et al., supra note 142 with Charles Chabal et al., Prescription Opiate
Abuse in Chronic Pain Patients: Clinical Criteria, Incidence, and Predictors, 13 CLIN. J. PAIN 150,
151-55 (1997). Dr. Bendtsen describes very different dilemmas facing a general practice
physician from those faced by Dr. Chabal, who manages a specialty pain practice. For
example, the profile of a patient being treated by a general practitioner is markedly different
than the patient profile presented in a pain clinic. In addition, the lower incidence of treating
chronic pain in general practice raises different problems and solutions regarding the
appropriateness of the use of opioids and possible addiction to narcotics than those employed
by pain specialists. Id.
144 See Chabal et al., supra note 143, at 153-55; Turk, supra note 11, at 220, 224-28.
145 See Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 239, 303-04 (1991) (noting that no standard exists to diagnose or classify chronic pain);
Turk, supra note 11, at 220-28.
146 See Portenoy, supra note 49, at 299 (noting addiction rate has approached 10%); Turk,
supra note 11, at 220-28 (noting addiction rates from previous studies); see also Pratt, supra note
135, at 229-30 (noting that opioids have been controlled since 1914).
147 See Stein, supra note 11, at 913; Turk, supra note 11, at 220-23.
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have failed to document any improvement of functional status for
patients on opioids.1 48 The question remains whether improved
functioning should be the goal or pain management is a satisfying
justification for using opioids. 149
A court will likely require evidence in the form of long-term,
randomized studies which show that the significant risk present in
the use of these drugs has been offset by some substantial gain in
functional status since the failure rate in patients using opioid
medication has approached 10%.150 The available data on the effects
of long-term opioid use has been encouraging, but may not be
sufficient for a court or jury trying to decide if a particular patient
would have benefited functionally from the treatment. Given the
current scientific knowledge, the defendant would likely argue that
the proper standard of care should be the customary practice of
using opioid medications sparingly, erring on the side of caution.
The above defense argument overlooks the fact that the medical
profession's failure as a whole to adopt and apply readily available
treatment modalities that could improve a patient's outcome or
relieve their pain and suffering is in fact a breach of professional
duty.151 In the past, courts have not hesitated to intervene and
declare what the standard shall be when the deficiencies in the
prevailing custom and practice within a profession are clearly
inconsistent with the recognized duties.152 This type of judicial
standard-setting would seem absolutely appropriate in the area of
pain management where clinical practice guidelines developed by
nationally recognized experts already exist.153 The fact that
148 See Dianne E. Hoffmann, Pain Management and Palliative Care in the Area of Managed
Care: Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 267, 269-70 (1998) (noting that physicians
reported some patients became non-functioning while taking opioids); Stein, supra note 11, at
913.
149 See Pratt, supra note 135, at 206-07 (indicating that undertreatment of pain in and of
itself is failure of modem medicine).
150 See Portenoy, supra note 3 (showing that approximately 10% of patients showed signs
of addiction); Zenz, supra note 11 (showing same).
151 See Rich, supra note 9, at 38.
152 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that maritime profession
was negligent in failing to adopt radios for receiving current weather reports); United Blood
Services v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 521 (Colo. 1992) (holding that customary practices of
bloodbanks was negligent when they failed to use modem tests to screen for HIV); Helling v.
Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding that customary practice of not administering
glaucoma testing to patients under 40 was negligent).
153 See, e.g., American Pain Society Quality of Care Committee, Quality Inprovement
Guidelines/or the Treatment of Acute Pain and Cancer Pain, JAMA Dec. 20, 1995 (Vol. 274, No. 23)
<http://www.ampainsoc.org/pub/qi.htm>.
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physicians in general have failed to incorporate these guidelines into
their practice should not be dispositive on the issue of liability, and
should not preclude the plaintiff from introducing the guidelines as
evidence of the standard of care.154
2. Error of Judgment vs. Professional Negligence
Assuming a court is inclined to accept the developing body of
scientific data regarding the efficacy of opioids as evidence of the
standard of care, the plaintiff would need to show that the
physician's alternative choice of therapy constituted negligent
conduct, and not merely an acceptable alternative treatment under
the circumstances. 155 In the context of medical malpractice, a
physician is required to use his/her best judgment, but the law has
not held a physician liable for mere error in judgment.156
Courts have held that if an alternative form of treatment was
available for a particular medical condition, either of which would
have been acceptable, the physician may not be found negligent
because the treatment he/she chose failed to remedy the patient's
medical condition.157 The choice between alternative treatments was
a question of professional judgment and cannot be the basis for a
breach of duty action.158 If the physician's judgment had a
154 See United Blood Sen'., 827 P.2d at 521; Hyams, supra note 91, at 454-55; Rich, supra note
9, at 81; Shapiro, supra note 82, at 361-62.
155 See McDonald v. The Tom Lyle, 48 F. 690, 693 (W.D. Pa. 1891). Courts recognize the
distinction between negligence and error of judgment. In a case involving the negligence of a
riverboat captain, the court stated:
The distinction between an error of judgment and negligence is not easily determined. It
would seem, however, that if one, assuming a responsibility as an expert, possesses a
knowledge of the facts and circumstances connected with the duty he is about to perform,
and, bringing to bear all his professed experience and skill, weighs those facts and
circumstances, and decides upon a course of action which he faithfully attempts to carry
out, then want of success, if due to such a course of action, would be due to error of
judgment, and not to negligence. But if he omits to inform himself as to the facts and
circumstances, or does not possess the knowledge, experience, or skill which he
professes, then a failure, if caused thereby, would be negligence.
Id.
156 See Brown v. United States, 419 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1969); Larkin v. New York, 446
N.Y.S.2d 818,822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
157 See Spadaccini v. Dolan, 63 A.D.2d 110, 120,407 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). In
discussing the appropriateness of whether an error of judgment charge should have been
given to the jury, the court stated, "An error of judgment charge is appropriate in a case
where a doctor is confronted with several alternatives and, in determining appropriate
treatment to be rendered, exercises his judgment by following one course of action in lieu of
another." Id.; see also Kroll v. United States, 708 F. Supp. 117,118 (D. Md. 1989).
158 See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175,187 (Kan. 1994). The Kansas Supreme Court stated:
In many, if not most, instances there is more than one acceptable approach to treatment,
and the fact that one doctor selects one method as opposed to another does not in and
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reasonable basis, and the judgment is ultimately determined to be
erroneous, the physician will not be found negligent.159
Applying this analysis, the plaintiff may not be entitled to
compensation because the physician chose an alternative treatment
rather than using opioids in treating his/her chronic pain. The
question that would ultimately need to be decided is whether the
physician was negligent in continuing the treatment after observing
little or no positive results. In an effort to protect a patient's rights
to humane treatment, however, a court could conclude that a
physician's persistent failure to acquire and apply current
knowledge and skills in effective pain management would be, as a
matter of law, negligent conduct rather than an error in judgment.160
The court must remember, however, that a physician cannot
guarantee success since "[i]n most situations the best medical
treatment in the world cannot provide an absolute guarantee of
success; medicine is not an exact science in that sense." 161
3. Proximate Cause and Measurement of Damages
Even if a plaintiff were to prove negligence, the court might
struggle to find an objective methodology to accurately measure
damages; however, courts successfully deal with similar issues in all
tort cases.162 Treating chronic pain with opioid medications cannot
itself mean one method is better than or preferable to another. For every treatment there
are undoubtedly other doctors who might have performed or used a different one.
Courts should use extreme caution in second-guessing the methods used by medical care
providers, particularly in an area as nebulous as the loss of a chance for a better or more
satisfactory recovery.
Id.
159 See NORMAN S. BLACKMAN & CHARLES P. BAILEY, LIABILITY IN MEDICAL PRACrICE: A
REFERENCE FOR PHYSICIANS 96 (1990) (discussing liability for error in judgment); Mangan,
supra note 128, at 319.
160 See James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89CVS64 (N.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 20, 1990) (holding
that refusal to administer adequate pain medication was negligence); Rich, supra note 9, at 83
(inferring same finding).
161 See McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1972).
162 The amount of damages available to the plaintiff in lost chance cases is generally equal
to the percent of a chance lost as a result of the physician's negligence, multiplied by the total
amount of damages that would be awarded. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. 741 P.2d
467,476 (Okla. 1987); see also Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (D. Kan. 1989).
Other courts have argued that this approach is flawed in that it creates a false sense of
accuracy. In Borgen v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Kan. 1989), the court rejected this
approach, noting that the methodology to calculate damages in lost chance cases creates a
highly subjective decision for a jury under any scenario, and chose instead a different
methodology as articulated by the Boody court. Id.
Still other courts have been wary that any precise method of attributing damages can be
reconciled in lost chance cases because of the speculative and uncertain nature of damages. In
Falcon v. Memorial Hospital, 462 N.W.2d 44, 65-68 (Mich. 1990) (Riley, C.J., dissenting), the
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guarantee total relief and in many pain situations opioids may
exacerbate rather than ameliorate pain.163 The pre-existing condition
that caused the plaintiff's pain must be factored against any gain
the plaintiff should reasonably have expected from the use of opioid
medication.164 It would be ludicrous for a court to hold a physician
liable for failing to cure all of his patient's pain.165 Expert testimony
would need to establish that the defendant physician's misconduct
was the probable cause, and not merely a possible cause, of some
compensable injury.166
III. THE LIKELIHOOD OF COURT ACCEPTANCE
A review of recent case law shows a trend: courts have
entertained this cause of action in cases involving terminally ill
patients. In Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp.,1 67 a jury
awarded the plaintiff's estate $15 million in damages. A nurse and
her employer (a nursing home franchise) had reduced the dosage of
pain medication which had been prescribed by the patient's
physician.168 The plaintiff died suffering intolerable pain. The nurse
in this case made a unilateral decision to reduce the dosage for oral
morphine, despite the physician's orders, because she determined
that the patient was addicted to the drug. When the patient had
entered the nursing home he was only expected to live six
Chief Justice argued against the adoption of the lost chance doctrine stating that the doctrine
imposes uncertainty and speculation upon the medical profession. Justice Riley stated:
I believe it is unwise to impose liability on members of the medical profession in such
difficult circumstances as those now before this Court. Rather than deterring undesirable
conduct, the rule imposed only penalizes the medical professional for inevitable
unfavorable results. The lost chance of survival theory presumes to know the
unknowable. ... The desire to compensate for the chance that the decedent might have
survived while understandable, is not justifiable.
Id. at 67-68.
163 See Brownlee, supra note 47, at 59.
164 See Brandt & Guthmann, supra note 128, at 474-76; King, supra note 127, at 1356-60.
165 See McBride, 462 F.2d at 75; Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994).
166 See Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.D.2d 1294 (Md. 1987) (holding that expert testimony
failed to establish that patient had "substantial possibility of better result" had he received
proper treatment); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) ("To avoid a
directed verdict a plaintiff must introduce expert medical testimony that it was more probable
than not that the death resulted from the doctor's negligence. The jury cannot be permitted to
speculate as to whether earlier diagnosis or different treatment would have resulted in a
cure").
167 No. 89CVS64 (N.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 20, 1990); see also Robert Angarola, Inappropriate
Pain Management Results in High Juny Award, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 407 (1991).
168 See Angarola, supra note 167, at 407.
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The plaintiff successfully proved that the nurse and her employer
breached their duty of care owed to Mr. James and caused him to
suffer needlessly, without regard to the consequences. The jury
verdict was reserved, pending the parties' settlement. Judge Grant
stated in his summary statement approving the settlement that the
plaintiff's action was not based on any claim that the actions of the
defendants' had caused the death of Mr. James. Rather, the award
was appropriate because the negligence of the defendants' had
caused Mr. James additional pain and suffering which could have
been avoided with appropriate palliative care.170
Cases from Georgia and California, which have primarily focused
on the right of a patient to request withdrawal of life-sustaining
care, seem to apply the same reasoning. In State v. McAffee, 171 the
court held that the withdrawal of life support from a terminally ill
patient required the physician to initiate pain control to alleviate the
patient's subsequent suffering. The court stated that the right to
pain treatment was inseparable from a patient's request to withdraw
or withhold life support, and that the failure to initiate pain
medication was a breach of duty by the physician. The right to pain
medication was deemed an inherent element of a patient's right of
self-determination in requesting withdrawal of treatment.172
In Bouvia v. Superior Court,173 a California court reached the same
conclusion. This case involved a request from a patient to remove a
nasogastric tube. In dicta, the court indicated that the caregivers
had a responsibility not only to comply with the patient's request,
but also "to perform a substantial, if not greater part of their duty,
i.e. that of trying to alleviate Bouvia's pain and suffering."'174
In Continued Care, Inc., v. Fournet,175 the Texas Court of Appeals,
in discussing proximate cause, echoed a similar philosophy.
Although the court reversed the trial court, disagreeing with its
determination as to proximate cause, it seems that the Texas Court
of Appeals was inclined to let the jury verdict stand. 76
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 385 S.E.2d 651 (1989).
172 See id. at 652.
173 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986).
174 Id. at 1145.
175 979 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App. Ct. 1998).
176 See id. at 422-23 (finding that evidence adduced at trial was too speculative to fulfill
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Each of these cases involved a terminally ill patient suffering near
the end of their life. Under these circumstances the courts seem less
concerned with the normal issues of tolerance, physical dependence
or addiction (cited by many physicians as reasons for their caution
in prescribing opioid medications). These are particularly
inappropriate concerns in the case of a dying patient. 77 Moreover,
side-effects such as respiratory depression and somnolence have
diminished importance when evaluating the needs of a dying
patient. Physicians should not be overly concerned that the
adequate administration of opioids to relieve pain for a terminally ill
patient may hasten death.' 78 Therefore, it seems that the viability of
this cause of action has already gained a modicum of acceptance
with respect to the terminally ill patient.
CONCLUSION
The history of the common law, both in England and the United
States, shows that the evolution of the civil tort system has proven
to be a powerful force in advancing social policy and vindicating
personal rights. As the needs of society change, courts have been
willing to fashion new or expanded causes of action drawn from
requirements of foreseeability or cause-in-fact in Mr. Fournet's death).
177 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Pain and Symptom Control Patients Rights and Physician
Responsibilities, 10 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY CLIN. OF No. AMERICA 41, 42 (1996) (describing
these fears of addiction, tolerance and dependence as irrational in context of terminally ill
patient).
178 Although beyond the scope of this article, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the
Supreme Court s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), focused directly on
this issue and may have fundamentally changed the legal landscape for the right to pain
medication for terminally ill patients. Justice O'Connor drew a distinction between a
generalized right to assisted suicide and a "narrower question whether a mentally competent
person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death." Id. at 2303. Justice O'Connor
went on to say that she joined the majority opinion because in these challenges there was no
need to address this narrower issue. Implicit in her opion is the inference that if the Court
were to hear the case of a patient who claimed that there existed barriers to receiving
adequate pain medication to alleviate suffering at the end of life, the Court could recognize a
liberty interest in this type of case.
Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion "except insofar as it joins the
majority" and he went on to state that Justice O'Connor's "views, which I share, have greater
legal significance than the Court's [Chief Justice Rehnquist's] opinion suggests." Id. at 2310.
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg's brief comment seemed to mirror the views expressed by.
Justice Breyer.
Since two of the Justices, Stevens and Souter, were ready to acknowledge the right to
physician assisted suicide, it is highly likely that they would also vote to recognize this
interest, and their votes would form a majority. Id. at 2275 & 2305. One could reasonably
conclude that a terminally ill plaintiff advancing a claim based on a constitutional liberty
interest to opioid medications for palliative care would prevail.
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traditional concepts of tort theory to accommodate those changes.
Courts should fashion such a civil remedy for patients suffering
from non-terminal, intractable pain. For over a decade, physicians
have resisted the scientific evidence demonstrating that most pain
can be effectively treated with opioid medications. This resistance is
based on myths, lack of knowledge, and irrational fears concerning
addiction rather than any plausible scientific theory. In order to
protect patients from the pervasive, customary practice of
undertreating pain, courts should engage in judicial standard-
setting by recognizing current pain management guidelines as the
standard of care for the treatment of chronic, intractable pain.
Allowing recovery under this tort theory will vindicate the rights of
the millions of patients forced to endure needless pain as part of
their daily existence.
Michael J. Reynolds
